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NOTES AND COMMENTS
of implied agreement) justifies the roundabout means taken to reach
that end. It is at least questionable whether unnecessary complications
and needless refinements in the law are justifiable.
Unfortunately the Court has failed to explain why they saw fit to
award damages in the present case at all. There is no indication in
the opinion, except for the fact that a conditional vendor was held
liable in damages for taking the property sold under a conditional
sale, as to whether or not the Court adopted either of the theories open
to it. An excellent opportunity to clarify the North Carolina law of
conditional sales has been lost. What would have been a valuable
precedent is just another obscure opinion, deriving whatever value it
may have from the fact that possibly it is a straw in the wind indicating
that the Court is somewhat dissatisfied with the North Carolina law of
conditional sales as it relates to the right to possession before default.
FRED R. EDNEY.
Conflict of Laws-Full Faith and Credit-Recognition
of Foreign Divorce Decrees-Domicile
It is of interest to note that a North Carolina case1 has recently
furnished the occasion for a reversal by the United States Supreme
Court2 of its decision in Haddock v. Haddock.3 The North Carolina
case involved the prosecution for bigamous cohabitation of two citizens
of this state who had remarried after having obtained divorces in
Nevada upon compliance with the six weeks residence requirement of
that state. In neither divorce action was the defendant personally
served in Nevada nor did the defendant enter an appearance. Haddock
v. Haddock involved a divorce granted by a state which was the domi-
cile of one spouse but not the last matrimonial domicile of the parties.
It was held that in the absence of personal service or appearance by the
defendant in the action, such divorces, valid in the state where granted,
need not be given full faith and credit by other states although such
states might recognize them as a matter of comity. In accordance with
this rule, North Carolina refused to recognize the divorces in the in-
stant case.
In Bell v. Bell4 it was decided that a state where neither party was
domiciled could not grant a divorce even though both parties personally
appeared. The North Carolina court suggested as another possible
ground for its decision that if it were found that the plantiffs had
I State v. Williams, 220 N. C. 445, 17 S. E. (2d) 769 (1942). Commented on
in Note (1942) 20 N. C. L. Rrv. 294.2Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. ed. (Adv.
Ops.) 189 (1942).S201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525, 10 L. ed. 867 (1906).
'181 U. S. 175, 21 S. Ct. 551, 45 L. ed. 804 (1901).
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failed to establish bona fide domiciles in Nevada the divorces were void
under the rule in the Bell case. The majority of the Supreme Court,
however, avoided passing upon this question by applying the doctrine
"that if one of the grounds for conviction is invalid under the Federal
Constitution the judgment cannot be sustained."5, Since this view
required the court to treat the case as though bona fide domiciles had
been established, the opportunity was presented directly to overrule the
Haddock case.
The ground for reversal was that the Haddock decision created an
unwarranted exception in divorce cases to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause6 and also to the Act of Congress7 implementing that clause.
In Atherton z. Athertons it had been decided that where the decree-
granting state was also the last matrimonial domicile of the parties
divorces obtained therein on substituted service must be recognized by
other states. The court in the present case considered the distinction
between the after acquired domicile of the Haddock case and the last
matrimonial domicile of the Atherton case to be "immaterial, so far' as
the full faith and credit clause and the supporting legislation are con-
cerned." Therefore, it was decided that divorces granted at the domi-
cile of one spouse must be given full faith and credit by other states so
long as the requirements of procedural due process are complied with.
The two dissenting justices9 took the position that the plaintiffs had
never, acquired bona fide domiciles in Nevada and that the divorces were
not therefore entitled to full faith and credit by North Carolina. This
argument flows from the idea that the sovereign power of the state to
determine the marital status of its citizens should not be infringed upon
by other states simply because of a residence therein for a few weeks.
Furthermore, the upholding of such divorces would tend to substitute
the policy of the least strict state for that of all the rest. Since the
majority of the court expressly refused to decide this question, a
strong possibility of attack upon the "Reno Divorce" is thus left open
in spite of the rejection of the Haddock v. Haddock doctrine. The
cause had been remanded for new trial by the North Carolina court.10
Consequently it may yet become necessary in this same litigation for
the United States Supreme Court to decide "as to the power of North
Carolina to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada divorce decrees be-
5 Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 368, 51 S. Ct. 532, 535, 75 L. ed.
1117, 1122, 73 A. L. . 1484, 1489 (1931).
" U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, §1.
7 REV. STAT. §905 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. 687 (1928).
B 181 U. S. 155, 21 S. Ct. 544, 45 L. ed. 794 (1901).
'See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 308, 63 S. Ct. 207, 217, 87 L.
ed. (Adv. Ops.) 189, 200 (1942) (dissenting opinion).
"I State v. Williams, 222 N. C. 609, 24 S. E. (2d) 256 (1943).
[Vol. 21
NOTES AND COMMENTS
cause, contrary to the findings of the Nevada court, North Carolina finds
that no bona fide domicile was acquired in Nevada." ' .*
ARTHUR C. JONES, JR.
Federal Venue-Plaintiff Denied Option to Sue in His Home
District Where Federal jurisdiction not Founded Solely
on Diversity of Citizenship
The general federal venue statute reads: "... no civil suit shall
be brought in any district court against any person by any original proc-
ess or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an
inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that
the action is between citizens of different States, suit shall be brought
only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff pr the
defendant."' * A recent case has reiterated the well established judicial
emphasis placed on the word "only" in the statute. Suit was instittited
in federal court in the district of the residence of the plaintiffs and both
diversity of citizenship and the presence of a federal question were set
up as grounds for federal jurisdiction. Held: Since the federal judis-
diction was not founded solely on diversity of citizenship each defend-
ant was entitled to be sued in the district of which he was an inhabi-
tant. On apt motion by the defendants the suit was dismissed.2
Federal venue is not the same thing as federal jurisdiction. Venue
has to do with the geographical situs of the suit,--with which par-
ticular federal court shall hear the case; jurisdiction concerns the sub-
stantive power of any federal court to take cognizance of the suit.
Even if jurisdiction is established the venue must still be properly laid.
"1* In that event the Court will face these facts: first, that when the courts
of divorce mill states find that divorce seeking transients are residents having
no fixed intention to depart after the divorce is obtained, these courts are guilty
of falsehood; second, the motive for the falsehood is to obtain the divorce busi-
ness; third, if courts of other states are required by the Supreme Court to accept
such a finding, then they are being required to recognize that their own citizens
were domiciled where those citizens were not domiciled; fourth, the divorce mill
states, if other states must recognize their product, are enabled to fix the divorce
law for every state in the union as to those citizens having the price of a trip
to the divorce mill states; fifth, whatever we may think should be the solution
of the difficult and vital divorce problem, it would be hard to conceive of a worse
method of solving it than to have the law fixed for the whole country by a few
states framing their law with the motive of making profit from severing mar-
riages.--Ed.
1*18 STAT. 470 (1875), 24 STAT. 552 (1887), 25 STAT. 433 (1888), 28 U. S.
C. A. §112 (1927) (judicial Code §51). Italics supplied. The statute formerly
read: "And no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts [circuit
or district] against any person by any original process or proceeding in any
other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be
found at the time of serving such process or commencing such proceeding...."
18 STAT. 470 (1875). Hollingsworth v. Adams, 12 Fed. Gas. 348, No. 6,611 (C.
C. D. Penn. 1798).2 Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Slaff, 131 F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942).
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